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Why do people who normally refrain from committing illegalities become digital pirates? In 
this paper we use a theoretical model of digital piracy combined with a game-theoretic 
mechanism of social norm formation to argue that no social stigma is attached to digital 
piracy because the latter has no perceived social cost; therefore, there is no pressure to build a 
norm condemning it. We note the existence of a "sophisticate" form of piracy focused on 
high-quality copies, and not on Internet downloads and black market purchases of low-quality 
copies like the most common form. Somewhat paradoxically, sophisticate piracy could help to 
generate a social attitude against piracy, because it is self-containing. However, it is limited in 
its scope, and it is difficult to predict whether it might ever become sufficiently widespread to 
effectively engender the formation of an anti-piracy social norm. 
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While preparing this paper, I found it useful to collect information from journalistic sources. I 
have used in particular the online archive of the US magazine Time, www.timearchive.com. I 
would like to thank Cinzia Ciardi for guiding me through the social psychology literature on 
social norms and conformism. 1 Introduction
In a charmingly disquieting line from the Oscar-winning ￿lm Chicago, the women awaiting trial
for having killed their misbehaving partners claim that what they did "[was] a murder but not
a crime". A similar attitude seems to prevail among the millions of people who purchase or
however acquire illegal copies of records, movies and software, or actually make their own copies
at home; they may accept the idea that what they do is a theft, but do not appear to consider it
a crime.1 There are of course laws declaring these copies illegal, and, at least on paper, sanctions
may be encountered if one is caught buying or making a copy. However, the enforcement of
the rules is at best a half-hearted a⁄air, partly because piracy of information goods is almost
impossible to monitor given its scope, partly because the legal norm does not re￿ ect the actual
social attitude. Occasionally, deeper attempts at ￿ghting piracy are made, like the o⁄ensive
against P2P networks launched by the Record Industry Association of America in the summer
of 2003 (on which see e.g. Peitz and Waelbroeck 2004); but these are exceptions rather than the
rule. Not even countries with a high reputation for ethical behaviour are immune; for example,
Sweden, a country ranking among the least corrupt in the world according to Trasparency
International (see www.transparency.org), is home to one of the best developed networks of
digital pirates in Europe.2
Seemingly, economists should not be surprised by the scale of the phenomenon. It is simply,
we may think, the normal reaction of rational agents to the state of a⁄airs. As just noticed,
there are very little risks involved in this sort of illegal activity, while the rewards are immediate
and obvious. Copying technology is cheap, easy to use and readily available; free downloads
are, as it were, at your ￿ngertips (there are an estimated 885 million music ￿les available on line
for illegal downloading)3; purchasing a pirated movie on the beach is the simplest thing in the
world. In fact, one has the feeling that the right question to ask is not ￿ why are lots of people
doing these things?￿but ￿ why are there still people who don￿ t?￿ .
These remarks leave however an important stone unturned. In fact, the same people who
download pirated movies from the net are often perfectly honest taxpayers, do not steal beer
cans from supermarkets, pay their tickets when they catch a bus, and so on. What is it, then,
1Just to avoid misunderstandings, let me state here that I personally own a legitimate copy of Chicago.
2I thank a referee for suggesting the example of Sweden.
3The estimate is supplied by the International Federation of the Phonogra￿c Industry (IFPI) ￿ see Grose
(2006).
2that motivates the individuals to take such a di⁄erent perspective when it comes to digital
products?
Let￿ s try and look at the problem from the opposite angle. A commonly advocated explana-
tion for apparent deviations from rational behaviour is the existence of social norms that imply a
stigma for those who do not adhere to them. For example, dodging taxes may be quite lucrative,
and still many people may refrain from it because of the psychic costs associated with violating a
custom that condemns such instances of antisocial behaviour (see e.g. Myles and Naylor, 1996).
Of course, one might ask why the social norm has been established in the ￿rst place. The lit-
erature on endogenous norms (see Akerlof 1980 for a path-breaking contribution) suggests that
customs are accepted and become binding within a group only inasmuch as they serve some
useful purpose within the group itself; to continue the above example, Balestrino (2007) argues
that customs condemning tax dodging are collectively useful in that they guarantee a smoother
redistribution process and favour social competition and mobility. More generally, it is easy to
conceive of social norms as a sort of public good, and thus understand why they may arise. For
example, the more a society is free from criminal activities like, say, thefts or burglaries, the
better for everybody; less personal and social resources have to be wasted on preventing and
punishing these activities. Thus, all that contributes to reduce them, including social norms
stigmatising thieves and criminals in general, is similar in nature to a public good in that all
the members of the society bene￿t from it in a non-rivalrous and non-excludible way. Just like
formal procedures can be activated for the provision of actual public goods by the State, in
the same way informal processes can lead to the establishment of social customs having public
good properties. This is basically the core of the argument by Coleman (1990) on the incentive
provided by the presence of externalities for the creation of social norms (see also Dufwenberg
and Lundholm, 2001 and Falkinger, 2004).
A useful way of framing the question would then seem to be that of asking the following. Why
do social customs prevent many people from cheating the government, from stealing beverages
and from free-riding on buses, but not from acquiring illegally duplicated music, software or
￿lms, or indeed from making copies on their own? To put it in more colorful terms, why can
one freely show one￿ s collection of copied CD￿ s to a friend, and share them, in a way one would
not show one￿ s collection of, say, stolen watches? If we adopt the above perspective, we see the
answer immediately: if there is no social value attached to stigmatising illegal copies of digital
3products, the stigma will not arise.4
In this note, we present a model of end-user piracy illustrating the above issues. In the
next section, we discuss our modelling strategy; at the same time, we clarify the questions
we ask, and provide a summary of the main arguments we develop. Section 3 introduces a
formal model of consumption and production of digital goods in the presence of piracy. Section
4 develops an approach to the formation of social norms, and tries to discuss why under the
present conditions a norm against digital piracy is tendentially weak, and whether it could
become stronger. Finally, section 5 o⁄ers a concluding comment.
2 Digital piracy and social norms: a modelling strategy
Work on piracy of information goods is usually focused on two issues: i) do producers su⁄er from
the existence of copies, and, ii) does the possibility of copying lower social welfare? Interestingly,
the answer isn￿ t univocally ￿ yes￿to either question. Depending on a number of factors, it may
well happen that ￿rms see their pro￿ts increased because of copying, and it is also possible that
piracy is welfare- or actually Pareto-improving. In fact, it may be that copying enlarges the
overall number of users, thereby raising the willingness to pay for the legitimate users due to
a network e⁄ect and thus enhancing the industry pro￿ts; or it may be that low-quality copies,
shared e.g. within a P2P network, allow the consumer to sample the original products, so that
they can get a very precise idea of what they like and then purchase it legitimately. And even
if the production sector stands to lose from the existence of copies, the increase in consumer
surplus may overcompensate the loss, leading to an overall welfare improvement. While we
refer the reader to Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003) for details and references, it seems possible to
conclude that the literature does not yield a clear-cut support to the digital industry insistence
that copying is made illegal, and that the authorities crack down on digital pirates: banning
piracy does not appear to be necessarily good for the society as a whole, and not even for the
industry itself.
In the present contribution, we keep the above results in the background, and we refer
4One of the referees noted that a factor contributing to minimise the psychological discomfort of stealing from
a "faraway" entity such as a recording company is the so-called "identi￿able victim e⁄ect" (see Lowenstein et al.
2005). Social norms bite when the agent is tempted to steal from a speci￿c person, with a clearly identi￿able
individuality, but lose strength when the victim is a faceless institution. This explanation is de￿nitely compatible,
and indeed complementary, with our analysis.
4to them when necessary, but we aim to o⁄er a complementary perspective in that we look
at the very basic question of why piracy is such a common practice (unlike many other illegal
activities).5 In order to focus on this question, we simplify the model in two important respects.
First, we assume that digital products are supplied by a pro￿t-maximising monopolist; we thus
avoid the complications that might arise from considering the role of strategic interactions (on
which see e.g. Belle￿ amme and Picard 2004). Second, we ignore the important circumstance
that most digital products are experience goods, as we assume that consumers are perfectly
informed about what they buy; we therefore rule out a priori a role for piracy as a way to
collect information about the product (eventually leading to legitimate purchases) as well as a
role for the sale of downgraded o¢ cial versions as a means for the companies to ￿ght piracy
(for a clear discussion of this issue and several references, see the already cited review by Peitz
and Waelbroeck 2003).
As for modelling piracy, we start from the observation (commonly made in the literature)
that it can be of two di⁄erent sorts: a person can either i) make a high-quality copy from a
borrowed original or, ii) acquire a low-quality copy via an Internet download or a black market
purchase. For our purposes, it is relevant to emphasize the distinction between the quality of the
product that can be obtained with the two di⁄erent methods. Downloaded and black-market
copies are usually low quality, for a variety of reasons: in the case of music and ￿lms, they do
not come bundled with lyrics, photos, extras and other gadgets for which the consumer may
care, they may not o⁄er the best sound or video quality, they may not be compatible with all
play-back devices, etc; in the case of software, consumer support may be unavailable, etc. It
is sometimes possible to remedy to part of these de￿ciences by acquiring additional material
though further searches on the Internet (there are sites for downloading CD/DVD covers; others
for downloading lyrics; it is possible to ￿nd patches that make a pirated software look like the
real thing, etc.); but it is of course a costly process and in the end the overall quality is not
especially good anyway (the pictures of the covers are often low-de￿nition; the lyrics have to be
printed and kept separately from the CD; the patch may not work in all circumstances, etc.).6
Of course, the quality gap is perceived mostly by agents who care about quality in the ￿rst
place; our model makes a pervasive use of the fact that quality is largely subjective.
5We only focus on end-user piracy. References to for-pro￿t piracy can be found in Peitz and Waelbroeck
(2003).
6For a discussion of the di⁄erent quality of copies in the case of music, see Cameron (2002).
5Agents in our model are divided in two main groups; quality-indi⁄erent consumers attracted
by downgraded pirated products and quality-conscious consumers who purchase original prod-
ucts.7 The latter may also, given the chance, engage in the other version of piracy, which we
refer to (for want of a better term) as "sophisticate" piracy. The sophisticate digital pirates
have a good knowledge of information technology and, most importantly, are members of su¢ -
ciently large social groups whose members borrow and lend original products in order to make
a high-quality variety of copies using commercially available equipment and software, often sold
by the same ￿rms that are complaining about Internet piracy.8 We may plausibly guess that,
at the moment, sophisticate piracy is not especially widespread. It might become so: Peitz and
Waelbroeck (2004) report e.g. that, in 2003, 90% of US household owned a computer, and 80%
of these owned a CD-recorder; DVD-recorders can be expected to reach a similar penetration.
Still, the availability of the devices does not automatically imply their use for sophisticate piracy
purposes.
We need now to understand how informal norms against anti-social behaviour come to be
established within a society. As we mentioned, customs have the important role of favouring
the survival and ￿ ourishing of the group in which they become binding. We model the creation
of informal rules by closely paralleling the political economy approach, commonly employed to
study the establishment of formal rules. In that approach, it is assumed that di⁄erent agents
have di⁄erent preferences over policies, and that these preferences can be reconciled by means
of e.g. some voting mechanism. Here, we take the view that agents have preferences over the
social norm, and that these possibly con￿ icting preferences are aggregated through informal
procedures (social interaction, group pressure, etc.) to became a more or less well-established
custom.9 Di⁄erent groups (ordinary pirates, legitimate users and sophisticate pirates) have
7Some in￿ uential people in the movie industry seems to believe that this partition of consumers is a good
description of reality; George Lucas, the Star Wars director, advocates "day-and-date distribution" (i.e. movies
would open in theaters and be available on DVD the same day) as a way of ￿ghting piracy and argues that this
will not a⁄ect theater attendance basically because those who go to see the movie and those who buy a pirated
DVD are not the same people (Corliss 2006). Something of this sort is already happening in the music industry;
to mention just an important name, Depeche Mode (a British band with more than 25 years of career and a
widespread audience) put on sale, starting from April 2006, the recordings of 50 concerts from their 2006 tour, to
be pre-ordered on line or at the venue (information coming from www.depechemode.com, consulted May 2006).
8There are of course copy-protection technologies, but software removing them (or permitting to circumvent
them) is freely available on the Internet or actually on sale (personal copies are legitimate almost everywhere).
9There is a relevant social psychology literature on norm formation and conformism that is worth mentioning
6di⁄erent views on whether digital piracy should be socially condemned or not. Individuals with
little taste for quality (presumably the poorest segment of the population ￿quality is de￿nitely a
normal good, if not a luxury) are more prone to become ordinary pirates and therefore unlikely
to disapprove of digital piracy; they will adopt and disseminate a view that is consistent with
this attitude. Quality-conscious legitimate users are not going to pro￿t much from a reduction of
piracy either, because, as long as it does not threaten the survival of the industry, it should help
to keep prices down; they could thus be not particularly active in condemning piracy. Instead,
sophisticate pirates might, somewhat paradoxically, be good advocates of a social norm since
they rely on original products not only as such but also to make their copies, and hence, unlike
ordinary pirates, they get some bene￿t from keeping piracy under control and encouraging the
purchase of original products. We will also argue that, in a sense to be made precise below, the
presence of the sophisticate pirates may induce legitimate users to become more alert to the
dangers of piracy.
A commonly made observation is that the digital industry seems to be engaged in a sort of
apparently inconsistent behaviour ￿￿ghting actively one type of piracy but not the other. This
is well-know, but it may be worth pointing out that we o⁄er here a complementary explanation
to that already present in the literature. It is usually argued that the companies may devise
pricing strategies apt to appropriate revenue from groups sharing originals for the purpose of
making a copy ￿after all, it is as if they were selling to clubs; this is however not possible when
piracy takes the form of entirely eschewing the purchase of original products. Hence, the two
sorts of piracy do not damage the industry in the same way. The present analysis also points
out that sophisticate pirates may, additionally and rather unexpectedly, contribute to establish
the view that piracy is socially condemnable. We therefore see that it makes sense for the digital
industry to ￿ght ordinary pirates, and at the same time not to waste too many resources against
the sophisticate ones, also in terms of favouring the creation of a social climate in which piracy
is maintained within "functional" limits. Of course, it is not clear that sophisticate piracy might
ever reach the critical mass that it needs to engender the creation of a strong anti-piracy social
attitude; still, a strategy of indirect revenue appropriation can be expected to pay o⁄more than
one of relentless ￿ght.
in this respect; see e.g. the classical works by Sherif (1936) and Asch (1955). This literature studies empirically
the spontaneous formation of norms, and its enforcement via the actions of the majority or otherwise in￿ uential
groups. We return to this point in Section 4 below.
7In the next sections, we make the above chain of arguments more precise with the help of a
formal model.
3 A model of consumption and production of digital goods
There are potentially several sources of agent￿ s heterogeneity that may be relevant in the context
we are facing. For the purposes of our present approach, we focus on three sources, namely
income, education, and tastes. Obviously, income matters because of the di⁄erent consumption
bundles that agents with di⁄erent earnings may a⁄ord. Also, education matters because it
is empirically plausible to suppose that better educated people are more prone to become
sophisticate pirates, as they are more likely to possess the non-negligible social skills needed to
establish and maintain a networks of friends for borrowing (and lending) as well as the moderate
to high competence with several di⁄erent types of software and hardware needed to actually
make the copies. Finally, tastes matter because of our emphasis on the quality of the digital
product; some agents may be relatively indi⁄erent to such quality, while other may regard it as
extremely important.
Developing a model with three-dimensional agents￿ heterogeneity is of course no simple
matter. Luckily, in our framework, it seems natural to assume that all three traits are related
to one another in a systematic way; high-income agents are tendentially better educated, and
have a stronger taste for quality. We assume therefore that i) the education level (and therefore
the propensity to become a sophisticate pirate), and ii) the intensity of the preference for quality,
are both positively correlated with income. This way, we employ a standard model with one-
dimensional di⁄erences; at the same time, we are able, as it will become clear in what follows,
to assign a signi￿cant role also to the remaining two sources of heterogeneity.
Consider then an economy inhabited by a large number of agents; the total size of the
population is normalised to unity. Each agent is identi￿ed by his or her (￿xed) income y, which
is distributed over an interval [y￿;y+] according to a density function f (y). All agents have
the same quasi-linear utility function
U = c + u(x); (1)
where c is general consumption and x is a composite digital product that can be acquired, in
general, from three di⁄erent sources:
x = ￿ + ￿e(y) + !; (2)
8where ￿ are high-quality copies, ￿ are low-quality copies, ! are original products, and e 2 (0;1)
is a factor converting the low-quality copies into equivalent units of high-quality ones. In line
with the assumption made above, we suppose that e varies inversely with income, e0 < 0 (in
other words, quality is taken, very plausibly, to be a normal good); a low-income agent regards
the original product as almost perfectly substitutable with a low-quality copy, while a high-
income, quality-conscious, agent sees them as two quite distinct commodities. For simplicity,
high-quality copies have the same quality as originals. Notice how quality is largely a subjective
perception in our framework.
Copying techniques
The above formulation recognises the existence of both ordinary and sophisticate piracy. The
two methods involve costs and require abilities of di⁄erent sorts. In fact, the low-quality method
is available to everybody (since the black market o⁄ers a ready alternative to those who are
not familiar with Internet), whereas access to the high-quality one is much more di¢ cult. As
mentioned, the various skills to be employed by a sophisticate pirate are plausibly linked to
education, that does not appear explicitly in the model but is proxied by the income level. We
assume therefore that at each income level above a certain threshold e y > y￿ there is a certain
fraction ￿ of agents endowed with the above abilities; sophisticate pirates are thus only present
in income groups above e y. All pirates below e y are instead of the ordinary variety; for them, we
clearly have ￿ ￿ 0 in (2).
Let now ￿ (z;n) be the production function of home-made copies, where z denotes the
expenditure incurred for the production process (buying recordable discs, searching for copying
software, etc.) and n is the number of friends who can lend the agent an original product for
copying (or make the copy for him, or give him tips on how to make copies, etc.). We take ￿ (￿)
to be strictly concave and additively separable.10 The price of ! is denoted q, while the cost of
acquiring ￿ is taken to be t per unit; at the end of this Section we will look at how the price q
is determined, but since for the consumer it is given, for now we simply proceed to write the
budget constraint. To this end, we de￿ne the total cost of copies as (z + t￿)k; where k 2 [1;k+]
is a measure of the stigma attached to the act of acquiring a copy; we will discuss in Section 4
10A non-separable function would not alter the general direction of the results, but it would complicate the
analysis (especially the comparative statics).
9below how this stigma is formed (k > 1), or not formed (k = 1), as the case may be.11
The budget constraint is then
c + (z + t￿)k + q! = y; (3)
where we normalised the price of c to unity and z and k are expressed in units of income. Of
course, z ￿ 0 in (3) for the ordinary pirates. Solving for c and substituting into the utility
function yields the following maximisation problem:
max
z;￿;!
U (z;￿;!;k;t;q;y) = y ￿ (z + t￿)k ￿ q! + u(￿ (z;n) + ￿e(y) + !); (4)
subject to non-negativity constraints for all three choice variables (two for the ordinary pirates).
First order conditions are
u0￿z ￿ k ￿ 0; u0e(y) ￿ tk ￿ 0; u0 ￿ q ￿ 0; (5)
plus complementary slackness; the condition w.r.t. z does not apply to ordinary pirates.
Consumer types
Before investigating the solution in more detail, we need to discuss the "adjusted" relative price
of low-quality copies vs. original products, as it turns out to be a key factor in determining the





as the adjusted price of low-quality copies, then the adjusted relative price is P (￿)=q: Due to
the assumption that e decreases with income, P (￿) increases monotonically; quality-conscious
agents perceive low-quality copies as more expensive. From a simple manipulation of the ￿rst
order conditions (5), it follows that there will be a cut-o⁄ income level y￿ (k;t;q), implicitly
de￿ned by P (k;t;y￿)=q = 1; such that only agents with income y ￿ y￿ will buy originals,12
whereas all those with income y < y￿ get low-quality copies. A straightforward use of the
implicit function theorem shows that
y￿
k < 0; y￿
t < 0; y￿
q > 0; (7)
11In principle, the stigma may take di⁄erent values for the two types of pirates; however, as we will ￿nd out
that the expected outcome involves no stigma for piracy (k = 1), it seemed pointless to introduce the distinction
(which would have only complicated the analysis).
12The agents with y = y
￿ see in fact original products and low-quality copies as equivalent, so we assume that
they buy the former.
10that is, the threshold income level will go down as the social norms is reinforced or the cost of
low-quality copies increases, but it will go up as the price of legitimate products increases. This
simply says that the group of agents willing to buy originals will become smaller if low-quality
copies become relatively cheaper.
The cut-o⁄ income level y￿ helps us to de￿ne the size of the network (on which to rely for
copying) each sophisticate pirate has. We assume that
n = n(y;y￿ (k;t;q)); (8)
with n 2 (0;1); ny > 0; ny￿ < 0. This can be interpreted as follows. First, it makes sense to
assume that agents with higher income have a larger network, on grounds of the already invoked
argument that social skills are positively correlated with education (proxied by income). Second,
the network members must come from the group of agents who own original products; this group
will decrease in size as y￿ increases, and so will do the network.
The interaction between the two cut-o⁄ incomes y￿ and e y identi￿es various types of con-
sumers. The analysis can be carried out for all possible cases, i.e. for y￿ greater than, equal to,
or less than e y. However, we choose
e y > y￿: (9)
We regard this as the most plausible case, because it implies that all the skilled pirates are
willing to purchase originals, i.e. it rules out the possibility that some agents consume the
digital product only in the form of high-quality copies. The idea of a network in which all
members borrow and lend makes this type of consumer somewhat implausible ￿the lack of
reciprocity would isolate him or her from the group.
From (9) we derive then the existence of three consumer types: i) ordinary pirates, i.e.
agents with income between y￿ and y￿ (excluded ￿see fn. 12), who only consume low-quality
copies; ii) legitimate users, i.e. all agents with income between y￿ and e y plus a fraction 1￿￿ of
the agents with income between e y and y+, who only consume originals; iii) sophisticate pirates,
i.e. a fraction ￿ of the agents with income between e y and y+; who buy legitimate products but
also make high-quality copies. Note that the relative size of the three groups depends, among
other things, on the two exogenous parameters ￿ and e y. We will focus mostly on the empirically
plausible case in which ￿ is relatively small and/or e y relatively high, so that the sophisticate
pirates are a minority; however, we will sometimes investigate what might happen in case they
became a substantial share of the total population.
11We are now ready to consider the solution to the agent￿ s problem for the three di⁄erent
consumer types.
The mix of digital products
First, take high-earners endowed with the sophisticate copying technology. For the general case
of an interior solution13 in which the agent, besides owning originals, makes copies at home, the
arbitrage condition determining the equilibrium mix of digital products can easily be seen to
be ￿z (z;n(￿)) = k=q: Using the superscript ￿ to identify variables pertaining to this group, we
obtain the demand for original products, !￿; and that for the input in the copying technology,
z￿; as functions of k, t, q and y: Comparative statics results (see the Appendix for details of
derivation) are:
z￿
k < 0; z￿
t = 0; z￿
q > 0; z￿
y = 0; (10)
!￿
t < 0; !￿
q < 0; !￿
y < 0; (11)
while !￿
k cannot be signed. That is: i) when the social norm bites more, the agent spends less
on copies, but not necessarily buys more originals; ii) when the price of low-quality copies rises,
the agent￿ s outlay on copies is the same as before, but she buys less originals; iii) when the price
of originals rises, the agent spends more on copies and buys less originals; iv) when income rises,
the expenditure on copies remains the same, but legitimate purchases fall.
The signs of the e⁄ects on z are as expected, whereas those of the e⁄ects on ! deserve a
few words of explanation. As it is made clear in the Appendix, when either k or q changes,
there are two e⁄ects to consider, a direct one which has the expected sign, and an indirect one
(through n) which may have an opposite sign; when either t or y changes, we have only the
indirect e⁄ect. In the case of z, the indirect e⁄ect is small or absent, but in the case of ! it may
be relevant. For example, when k is marginally increased, copying becomes costlier in terms
of stigma, but at the same time there are more opportunities for copying because the network
becomes larger; thus, the two e⁄ects do not agree in sign for !￿
k. If t rises, there are more
people buying originals as a result of the increase in the price of low-quality copies, hence there
are more opportunities for making high-quality copies as n becomes larger, and thus the agent
buys less original products; similarly, if y rises, the purchase of originals falls because the larger
13The standard assumption that ￿z (z) ! 0 for z ! 1 and ￿z (z) ! 1 for z ! 0, combined with strict
concavity and additive separability of ￿ (z;n), is su¢ cient for an interior solution.
12network make copying easier.
Note that the above results concern the expenditure on copies z, not the amount of copies
￿. It is however easy to see that the combined impact of the e⁄ects in (10) and (11) and of
the changes in the level of n is ambiguous when either k or q varies, whereas it induces the
agent to make more copies when t rises; indeed, in the ￿rst two cases z and n move in opposite
directions, whereas in the third z is unchanged but n increases. Also, the number of copies ￿
increases with income, as z does not vary but n increases; thus, as income grows, the agent
replaces originals with home-made copies.
Second, we have agents with high incomes who only buy originals. The ￿rst order condition
is simply u0 = q; from which, using obvious notation, we obtain as a solution the demand for
legitimate products, !￿￿; as a function of q (due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function,
!￿￿ does not depend on y); clearly, we have
!￿￿
q < 0: (12)
Hence, the aggregate demand for legitimate products is
















!￿ (k;t;q;y)f (y)dy; (13)
that is the demand by legitimate users plus the demand by sophisticate pirates.
Finally, we have agents with low incomes who only acquire low-quality copies. For them,
the ￿rst order condition is u0 = P (k;t;y); and the solution is given by the demand for ￿ as a
function of k, t and y.
Selling digital products in a world of pirates
The legitimate copies of the digital product are sold by a pro￿t-maximising monopolist. The
choice variable is taken to be quantity. In order to identify correctly the pro￿t function, we
need to invert the market demand for the original product as de￿ned in (13). We ￿rst check



















q (￿;y)f (y)dy ￿ f (y￿)y￿
q (￿)!￿￿ < 0; (14)
we used the comparative statics results (10), (11) and (12) as well as (7) to ascertain the
sign. The three terms in (14) have the following simple interpretation: the ￿rst and second
term are the reactions to the own-price increase by the legitimate users and the sophisticate
pirates, respectively; the third is the variation in demand due to the marginal change in the
aggregate number of buyers of originals. Inverting ￿(k;t;q) yields the inverse demand function
q = q (￿;k;t): Then, the monopolist￿ s pro￿t is ￿ (￿;k;t) = ￿q (￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ where ￿ is the
constant marginal cost, and ￿ are ￿xed costs. This is to be maximised by choosing ￿; we
assume that the monopolist￿ s problem is well-behaved, i.e. the objective function is strictly
concave. The ￿rst order condition is
￿￿ = q + ￿q￿ ￿ ￿ = 0: (15)
Let the solution to the monopolist￿ s problem be ￿m; using the inverse demand function yields
the equilibrium price,
qm = q (￿m;k;t): (16)
4 Will piracy be socially condemned?
The digital industry would like to raise people￿ s awareness that copying music or movies or
software is against the law, and as such, a socially condemned act ￿a theft. Digital pirates are
thus ideally depicted as social pariahs, like all thieves. This is in fact rather wishful thinking;
in most environments, they are more like small-time heroes. Most people perceive that the law
has been introduced upon the insistence of the digital industry, and that the bad image of the
pirate is a fabrication. Why it is so? Why do most people seem to think that digital pirates
are the good guys after all ￿the white hats?
14The reaction of the market to variations in the social norm
To answer this question, we need ￿rst to discuss how the equilibrium price qm reacts when k
changes. It turns out that we cannot give a general answer. We have that
qm
k = q￿￿m
k + qk; (17)
where we can only determine that q￿ = 1=￿q < 0 by (14). We need to impose some (reasonable)
restriction in order to proceed; in particular, we will use linear approximations. This will not
entirely solve the ambiguity, but it will allow us to describe in some detail the conditions under
which qm






taking a linear approximation of the demand schedule in the monopolistic market for !, and

























kf (y)dy ￿ f (y￿)y￿
k!￿￿; (21)
where we used the fact that !￿￿ only depends on q.
In principle, one would expect that the demand for originals rises when the norm becomes
more stringent, with a consequent increase in the equilibrium price. This cannot be proven to be
always true, but it is arguably the most likely outcome: the second term in (21) tends to make
￿k; and hence qm
k ; positive, as a stronger social norm induces more agent to become legitimate
users, and, although !￿
k in the ￿rst term cannot be signed (see the comparative statics above),
it is reasonable to suppose that, should they disagree in sign, the second term dominates the
￿rst as long as sophisticate piracy is not especially widespread (￿ is small and e y is high).
To be more precise, we can state the following:
￿ qm
k > 0 occurs if !￿
k > 0, that is if sophisticate pirates buy more originals when the norm
becomes more stringent; or if !￿














15that is if sophisticate pirates are few and react to a more binding norm by purchasing
moderately less originals, so that the increase in the demand coming from the increase in
the number of legitimate users prevail.
￿ qm
k < 0 occurs if !￿
k < 0 and the inequality sign in (22) is reversed.
Although we regard the ￿rst case as more plausible, it is instructive to investigate the con-
ditions under which the second case obtains. From the comparative statics (see the Appendix)
we learn that !￿
k is negative when
U￿
!k = u00￿nny￿y￿
k < 0 (23)
is "su¢ ciently" large in absolute value (exactly how large is determined in the Appendix). Note
that U￿
!k < 0 re￿ ects the fact that whenever the psychic cost of piracy increases, originals have
less value in the eyes of the sophisticate pirates. This can be seen from both their perspectives,
as lenders and as borrowers in the network. As lenders, they purchase originals not only for
their own consumption, but also for giving them to their network friends, and this latter use
becomes less valuable when piracy becomes costlier; as borrowers, the increase in costs of piracy
and, consequently, the reduction in the number of ordinary pirates, enlarges the pool from which
originals can be borrowed and thus reduces their value for direct consumption. Then, if each
sophisticate pirate decides to buy less, rather than more, originals (!￿
k < 0), and if there are
enough sophisticate pirates (large ￿ and low e y), we would have qm
k < 0: Conditional on being
su¢ ciently widespread, sophisticate piracy might induce a unexpected behaviour of the market
price of originals. There are overall more people buying originals, but part of them express a
smaller demand; if the latter e⁄ect prevails, it induces a price reduction.
The agents￿opinions
We now focus on the indirect utility functions from the maximisation problems of the three
consumer types. We write these as
v￿ (k;t;qm); v￿￿ (k;qm); w(k;t) (24)
for sophisticate pirates, legitimate users and ordinary pirates respectively ￿recall that qm is
de￿ned by (16). By maximising these function w.r.t. k, we identify the preferred strength of
the norm for the three agent types, labeled k(y).
16Let￿ s start from ordinary pirates, whose optimal norm problem is
max
k
w(k;t) s.t. k ￿ 1 ￿ 0 and k+ ￿ k ￿ 0; (25)
the ensuing ￿rst order condition is
wk = ￿t￿ < 0 (26)
where we computed the derivative of the indirect utility function from (4). Clearly, by com-
plementary slackness, k(y) = 1 ; low-income agents (y < y￿) do not obtain any bene￿t from a
norm against piracy, it only raises their (perception of the) cost of copying.
For legitimate users, we have
max
k
v￿￿ (k;qm) s.t. k ￿ 1 ￿ 0 and k+ ￿ k ￿ 0; (27)




whose sign is the opposite as that of qm
k , which we saw to be ambiguous, although likely to be
positive ￿check the discussion of (17). In fact, if qm
k > 0, then v￿￿
k < 0; the legitimate users
share the view of ordinary pirates that piracy should not be condemned, as this has the useful
implication of lowering the price of originals ￿formally, k￿￿ (y) = 1 by the complementary
slackness conditions. In the less likely case that qm
k < 0, then v￿￿
k > 0; legitimate users will
become unrelenting advocates of the social norm, so as to induce a lower price for originals
￿formally, k￿￿ (y) = k+, as can again be easily seen using complementary slackness. It is
noteworthy that a deep penetration of sophisticate piracy is necessary for the legitimate buyers
to become full supporters of the norm; indeed, we noted above that qm
k < 0 cannot occur unless
there is a large number of sophisticate pirates (and other conditions are met).
Finally, the optimal norm for sophisticate pirates is found by solving
max
k
v￿ (k;qm;y) s.t. k ￿ 1 ￿ 0 and k+ ￿ k ￿ 0; (29)
this yields
v￿
k = ￿z ￿ qm
k !￿ + u0￿nny￿y￿
k ￿ 0; (30)
plus complementary slackness. At an interior solution we thus have an optimal level of k￿ (y)
satisfying a "marginal bene￿t equals net marginal cost" condition that can be written as follows:
u0￿nny￿y￿
k = z + qm
k !￿: (31)
17Indeed, the norm advantages the pirates in that they have a larger network on which to rely for
borrowing originals (l.h.s.); hurts them because it raises the (perception of the) cost of copying
(￿rst term on r.h.s.) and normally also the price of originals (second term on the r.h.s.).14
The formation of social norms
Just like in ordinary political economy models one proceeds to reconcile the agents￿policy
preferences using e.g. a voting mechanism, we can now aggregate the agents￿ideal levels of the
strength of the norm by postulating the existence of informal mechanisms that create a majority
view and then bring all agents to conform to that view. In order to understand and appreciate
the strength of these informal mechanisms, it may be useful to review brie￿ y the large social
psychology literature on the subject (already referred to in fn. 9). A wealth of empirical studies
(see e.g. Bond and Smith 1996 for a long list of references - more than 100 works) has shown
that conformism to the majority is a universal tract, surfacing (with of course di⁄erent strength)
in the most diverse cultures. If a su¢ ciently large group of people share a view, and support it
by their deeds and words, the others tend to conform even if they are opposed or indi⁄erent. In
fact, in one of the classical experiments, large fractions of participants conform to the opinion
of the majority even if they are sure, as made clear later by personal interviews, that such an
opinion is factually wrong. This is the so-called "line judgement task", originally devised by
Asch (1955) and repeated many times. It works roughly as follows. An experimenter asks to
the subject if he or she can guess the length of a line traced on a wall, in the presence of a
group of people whom the subject believes to be exclusively other subjects but are instead in
part experimenters. One of the tasks of these experimenters is to suggest inaccurate guesses as
a counterproposal to the subject￿ s guess. Even when it is clear that such counterproposal goes
wildly o⁄the mark, if a su¢ ciently large group of hidden experimenters supports it, the subject
often agrees with the view of the majority.
There are several explanations for this behaviour that have been advanced in the literature.
At least four have received widespread attention. Two of them have been proposed by Festinger
(1950) and have been collectively labelled "informational social in￿ uence"; the ￿rst is the need
to see our opinions and beliefs con￿rmed by those of the others, and the second is the presence
14From the discussion above we know that, under some circumstances, an increase in k might lead to a reduction
in the price of originals, in which case the second term on the r.h.s. will become a bene￿t rather then a cost.
This is why we referred to the whole r.h.s. as a "net cost".
18of some relevant shared goal that can be achieved by coordinating our e⁄ort with that of the
others. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) have formulated a theory of "normative in￿ uence", whereby
conformism would be dictated by the desire to avoid being isolated. Finally, Turner (1987),
with his "self-categorization" approach, has argued that conformism gives the agent her own
social identity, helps her to ￿nd her own "category". While it is possible that all the factors
identi￿ed by these authors are simultaneously at work, the one more relevant to our present
intentions seems to be the second process identi￿ed by Festinger (1950) and investigated among
others by Lewin (1965); if the members of the group perceive a clearly de￿ned common aim, and
identify the value of a given action or opinion for reaching that aim, they are strongly inclined
to conform to that action or opinion independently from their personal attitudes.
The conformism to a social norm, whose importance for the stability and ultimately the
strength of the group can be easily recognised, might be interpreted, in this light, as the informal
equivalent of the process leading to the creation of binding policy rules. Agents may perceive
that it is in their interest to limit anti-social behaviour, by removing the incentives that make it
individually rational; depending on the circumstances, this can be achieved by introducing, say,
compulsory taxation schemes in a formal procedure, or by establishing social customs against
such behaviour through informal means (Coleman 1990). Of course, in our case the reasoning
works, so to speak, backwards: the fact that there is little social value attached to a norm
against digital piracy contributes to explain why it is not felt as binding.
Conformism and attitudes towards piracy
Some sort of informal process like the ones described above might then lead to the establishment
of a social norm that prescribes a "lenient" attitude towards the digital pirates. How might this
work?15
Given an arbitrarily ￿xed norm (i.e. a value of k) determining y￿ and thus identifying the
three consumer types, we can partition the society in several groups, each with its view of
what is the correct attitude towards digital piracy. The actual partition depends on the sign
of qm
k ; we saw that the most relevant case is that in which qm
k > 0. Then, we have that all
ordinary pirates plus all legitimate users share the view that piracy should not be condemned,
the former because this is the only way they can a⁄ord to consume the digital product, and
15The formation of the norm as modelled in this subsection is inspired by the "conformism game" developed
by Balestrino (2007).
19the latter because they perceive that piracy contributes to reduce the price they pay for their
high-quality originals. The exact size of this group depends on the status quo norm. However,
it arguably constitutes the absolute majority of the population, as sophisticate pirates are few
by construction, and do not even constitute a group with a common view on the norm (there as
many groups as there are income levels of sophisticate pirates, each with a di⁄erent opinion).
The interaction between agents will then establish a society-wide level of the norm; a so-
phisticate pirate readily realizes that, outside the ring of his friends, there will be nobody prone
to contain the boundaries of piracy. The sophisticate pirate might wish to argue that copying
should be limited, but no matter whether he is facing an ordinary pirate or a legitimate buyer,
he will be hit by a counter-argument in favour of illimitate piracy. The content of the counter-
argument may vary, but what counts is that the vast majority of the population will back it by
its words and deeds. The psychic cost of defending one￿ s view, when everybody else is voicing
another opinion and behaving openly in accordance with this opinion, is usually very large, and
there will be little to do for the sophisticate pirate other than capitulate and conform (see our
discussion above).
We can model social interaction very simply as a round of two-players bargaining games.
One of the two players comes from the ranks of those who support a lenient attitute towards
piracy (k = 1); the other is a sophisticate pirate. The object of the game for player i is to
convince player j that his own view of the norm is the "correct" one (and viceversa for player
j). There are in principle two possible outcomes: one of the agents might convince the other or
they might continue to disagree. Each agent chooses between two options, that is: i) adopting
the other￿ s opinion ("agree") and ii) staying true to his original idea ("disagree"). The pay-o⁄
to "agree" is the utility derived from conforming to a norm which is not the preferred one,
therefore less than the maximised utility. "Disagree" instead implies a cost due to the e⁄ect
of conformism, that is a cost that depends on the di⁄erence in size between that two groups
to which the agents belong: for simplicity we normalise to zero the cost for the agent from the
larger group, and take the utility loss to be g > 0 for the agent from the smaller group. Suppose
for example that the two players are a sophisticate pirate and a legitimate buyer and that the
20latter moves ￿rst and proposes his own view;16 the pay-o⁄ matrix will be:
￿￿ s reaction ￿ ￿￿
agree v￿ (1;qm;y) v￿￿ (1;qm)
disagree v￿ (k(y);qm;y) ￿ g v￿￿ (1;qm)
Since sophisticate pirates are a tiny fraction of the population, g will certainly be very large;
"agree" will be the action giving them the higher pay-o⁄. More precisely, whenever
g ￿ v￿ (k(y);qm;y) ￿ v￿ (1;qm;y); (32)
the sophisticate pirate will switch sides.
Hence, provided that g is su¢ ciently large, after one round of social interaction, all agents
will agree that k = 1 is the correct norm, and this becomes the social custom. Given k = 1, y￿
is determined, and the three consumer types are identi￿ed for this level of the norm.17
5 Concluding remarks
Our formulation of the problem is consistent with the observation that social condemnation of
digital piracy is not strongly felt. As long as most piracy is of the ordinary variety, which is
probably a good description of the current state of a⁄airs, the vast majority of agents are not
opposed to it, and they do not act or talk against it. It is therefore clear that an anti-piracy
social norm has no collective value.
It is of some interest to consider whether and how things could change if, sometime in
the future, piracy becomes prevalently of the sophisticate variety (￿ becomes larger and/or e y
becomes lower). As long as this causes the majority of the agents to have something to gain
16Of course the same reasoning holds if the sophisticate pirate faces an ordinary pirate. It is also easy to see
that the outcome does not change if the sophisticate pirate moves ￿rst, as his opponent can refuse his o⁄er at no
cost, and then make his counterproposal.
17A more detailed approach would have been that of assuming a sequence of rounds in which the players are
randomly matched, as in Balestrino (2007). One could then investigate how, round after round, the view that
digital piracy should not be condemned spreads among the members the society, and let the sequence end when
all agents share this opinion. In the context of the present model, this is however unnecessarily complicated.
The fact that sophisticate pirates are a small fraction of the total population makes it estremely likely that the
case described in the main text (in which all games see a sophisticate pirate facing either an ordinary pirate or
a legitimate buyer) occurs early on, thereby determining the end of the sequence. We simplify by assuming that
this speci￿c round comes ￿rst.
21from such a norm, a mechanism leading to the establishment of a social custom against piracy
might possibly be activated. Suppose then that qm
k < 0. This case is more di¢ cult to deal
with, because there are now two large groups, ordinary pirates (k = 1) and legitimate users
(k￿￿ = k+) plus all the groups of sophisticate pirates with di⁄erent incomes (1 < k￿ (y) < k+);
social interaction requires now more than one round of simultaneous two-player games. We
discuss here a speci￿c development which might, but not necessarily will, lead to a norm against
piracy being imposed; the discussion has mostly a pedagogic value, in that it highlights the more
or less plausible conditions that have to be satis￿ed for the establishment of such a norm.
Suppose that social interactions are stronger among agents who are similar in some relevant
traits; in our context, this means agents with the same income (which we also used as a proxy
for education). Thus, the ￿rst round of games could involve all possible pairs of sophisticate
pirates and legitimate users within the same income groups; any agent without an opponent
will stay idle (supposing that ￿ < 0:5, these will be legitimate users). In these games, the
legitimate users have a much larger group backing their position, since they all share the view
that piracy should carry a strong social stigma; the sophisticate pirates have only agents in
their own income group sharing exactly the same opinion. So, either the legitimate users bring
the sophisticate pirates to accept their point of view, or the two stay of the same opinion as
before. For a su¢ ciently high cost of disagreeing, all sophisticate pirates will switch sides. In
this case, at the end of the ￿rst round of games, all agents with income above y￿ see piracy
as a particularly disreputable activity, k = k+: There is then a second round of simultaneous
games, with ordinary pirates on one side and either legitimate users or sophisticate pirates on
the other (and possibly some idle agents). If the latter constitute a su¢ ciently large majority,
then the social custom will be k = k+, that is piracy will be socially stigmatised; otherwise the
custom will be k = 1, that is piracy will be socially accepted.
An important corollary of the analysis is that sophisticate piracy is a self-containing activity.
Once it reaches a critical mass, it produces the forces that keep itself at bay, and prevent it
from swallowing the whole market for digital products. This is basically a re￿ ection of the fact
that sophisticate pirates need a pool of original products from which to ￿sh out the ones they
want to copy, and are interested in guaranteeing the availability of such products almost like
the wholly legitimate buyers. They thus trade-o⁄an increase in the stigma to which they can be
subjected for making copies against an enlargement of the "reservoir" of originals. Moreover, the
sophisticate pirates￿reaction to variations in the strength of the social norm are key, as we saw,
22for making the legitimate buyers aware of the dangers of an excessive enlargement of piracy, and
transforming them in the most extreme advocates of the norm. The digital industry ambivalence
towards the enlargement of the group of sophisticate pirates is thus perfectly understandable
in this context: they may fear an immediate loss of revenue, but it is clear that in the long run
this form of piracy can remain within functional limits, unlike the ordinary sort, and thus it
may make more sense to try and appropriate revenue indirectly from the sophisticate pirates
rather than running an endless, and costly, campaign to eradicate them.
Appendix
As mentioned in the main text, this section presents some details of the comparative statics
analysis for the sophisticate pirates (for the other groups the derivation is immediate). The ￿rst
order conditions are
U￿
z = u0￿z (z;n(y;y￿ (k;t;q))) ￿ k = 0; (A1)
U￿
! = u0 ￿ q: (A2)
It can be checked that the second order conditions are satis￿ed. We have that
U￿
zz = u0￿zz + u00 (￿z)
2 < 0; (A3a)
U￿
!! = u00 < 0; (A3b)
U￿
!z = U￿












￿2 = u00u0￿zz > 0; (A4)




k￿z ￿ 1 < 0; (A5a)
U￿
zt = u00￿nny￿y￿
t￿z < 0; (A5b)
U￿
zq = u00￿nny￿y￿
q￿z > 0; (A5c)
U￿




k < 0; (A6a)
U￿
!t = u00￿nny￿y￿
t < 0; (A6b)
U￿
!q = u00￿nny￿y￿
q ￿ 1; (A6c)
U￿
!y = u00￿nny < 0: (A6d)
Note that U￿
!q is ambiguous; however, it makes sense to assume
U￿
!q < 0; (A7)
on grounds that u00￿zny￿y￿
q is a second-order e⁄ect. Also, note that
U￿
zk = U￿
!k￿z ￿ 1; (A8a)
U￿
zt = U￿
!t￿z < 0; (A8b)
U￿
zy = U!y￿z: (A8c)





















































































where the signs follow from the strict concavity of u(￿) and ￿ (￿); and from (A3), (A5) and (A7).
These are the results given in the text as (10) and (11). It is clear from the derivation the role
24of what we called the direct and indirect e⁄ects in determining the signs of the comparative
statics.
In the main text, we discussed at some length the sign of (A10a). The formal analysis here
indicates that U￿
zz < 0 and U￿
z! < 0 by (A3), and that U￿
zk < 0 by (A5); moreover, we see from
(A6) that U￿














(A10a) will be negative; otherwise, it will be positive.
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